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THE  U.S.  PRODUCTIVITY  SLOWDOWN: 
WHAT  THE  EXPERTS  SAY 
U.S.  productivity  growth  has  slowed  significantly 
since  1973;  moreover,  U.S.  productivity  continues 
to grow  at a slower  rate  than  that  of our major  trading 
partners.  What  caused  these  things  to happen?  The 
answer  to  this  question  is still unsettled,  although  a 
number  of potential  explanations  are  being  debated 
in  the  economics  literature.  These  include  energy 
prices,  labor  quality,  measurement  error,  adequacy 
of mineral  resources,  governmental  regulations,  in- 
vestment  opportunities,  managerial  practices,  and 
governmental  trade  policies.  These  explanations  will 
be  discussed  in  this  article. 
Two  measures  of  productivity  are  commonly 
used.  Labor  productivity,  or output  per  hour,  is the 
simpler  of the  two  to  construct.  To  measure  output 
per  hour  in the  nonfarm  business  sector,  one  must 
first  measure  nominal  output,  defined  as the  market 
value  of  final  goods  and  services  produced  in  that 
sector.  Then  one  must  deflate  the  nominal  output 
by the  relevant  price  index  to obtain  real output.  The 
final  step  requires  dividing  the  estimate  of real  out- 
put  by  the  number  of hours  worked  in the  nonfarm 
business  sector  to  get  per  hour  output. 
Quarterly  labor  productivity  data for the  U.S.  non- 
farm  private  business  sector  from  1947  to  1987  are 
plotted  on Chart  1. The  chart  shows  actual  labor pro- 
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ductivity  plotted  relative  to the  2.4  percent  per  year 
trend  that  it averaged  in  1947-73  and  the  1 percent 
per  year  trend  that  it  averaged  in  197388. 
Total  factor  productivity  (TFP)  is another  way  of 
measuring  productivity.  The  TFP  measure  is popular 
among  growth  analysts  because  it provides  informa- 
tion  on  the  sources  of  economic  growth.  More 
precisely,  TFP  specifies  the  relative  contributions  to 
growth  attributable  to labor inputs,  capital inputs,  land 
inputs  (occasionally),  and  productivity-the  latter 
being  the  name  given  to  the  residual  component  of 
growth  not  attributable  to the  other  three  inputs.  The: 
productivity  residual  thus  measures  how  efficiently 
the  inputs  of  labor,  capital  and  land  are  used  in. 
producing  output.  The  actual  estimation  of TFP  is 
complicated.  Readers  interested  in  studying  total. 
factor  productivity  in  more  detail  might  begin  by 
reading  the  BLS  publication,  “Trends  in  Multi-. 
factor  Productivity,  1948-81”  (231,  which  contains 
references  to  other  important  works. 
Chart  2 illustrates  the  different  time  paths  of labor 
productivity  (output  per  hour)  and  multifactor  pro- 
ductivity  (the  BLS  name  for its measure  of total  fac- 
tor  productivity)  over  the  1948-88  time  period.  The 
chart  illustrates  that  multifactor  productivity  growth 
after  1973 slowed  by about  the  same  amount  as labor 
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10  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JULY/AUGUST  1989 productivity  growth.  In  1948-73  multifactor  produc- 
tivity  averaged  1.7 percent  growth  per  year,  but  the 
rate  slowed  to  0.2  percent  in  1973-88. 
Table  I shows  the  growth  in  average  U.S.  labor 
productivity  in  the  pre-  and  post-1973  periods  in 
comparison  to  the  productivity  growth  of  selected 
other  countries.  The  table  shows  that  productivity 
growth  worldwide  has declined  since  1973,  but it also 
illustrates  the  second  part  of  the  productivity 
puzzle,  that  U.S.  productivity  growth,  at 0.6  percent 
per year,  remains  well below  that  of a number  of other 
countries. 
I. 
THE DECLINE IN  U.S.  PRODUCTIVITY  GROWTH 
SINCE 1973 
In  1985,  Edward  Denison  [lo]  published  an  ex- 
haustive  study  of  the  U.S.  productivity  slowdown. 
He  concluded  that  four  factors  clearly  contributed 
to  the  post-1973  slowdown,  two  modestly  and  two 
substantially.  The  modest  contributors  were:  1) a 
decline  in  investment  per  worker  and  2)  more  in- 
tensive  environmental  and worker  protection  regula- 
tions.  The  major  contributors  to the  slowdown  were: 
1) the  end  of the  population  shift  from  low produc- 
tivity  farm  and  self-employed  jobs  to higher  produc- 
tivity  jobs  (15  percent  of the  slowdown),  and  2) the 
effects  of  the  1973-75  and  1980-82  recessions  on 
economic  growth  (16  percent  of  the  slowdown). 
In all, the  Denison  study  attributed  40 percent  of 
the  post-1973  productivity  slowdown  to  identifiable 
sources.  The  study  largely  ignored  the  energy  crisis, 
however,  and  dismissed  declining  labor  quality  as a 
source  of slower  productivity  growth.  This  article  will 
accept  Denison’s  estimates  of the  effects  of popula- 
tion  shifts  and  the  recessions  on productivity,  which 
together  account  for  almost  one-third  of  the  1.5 
percentage  point  growth  slowdown.  Thus,  only  one 
percentage  point  per  year  remains  to  be  explained. 
Other  possible  sources  of  declining  productivity 
growth  include: 
Measurement  error 
Declining  labor  quality 
Rising  energy  prices 
Environmental  protection  regulations 
Depletion  of  mineral  resources 
Depletion  of  investment  opportunities 
Measurement Error] 
In  a  1988  article  [4],  Martin  Baily  and  Robert 
Gordon  investigated  whether  a portion  of  the  pro- 
ductivity  slowdown  could  be  attributed  to measure- 
ment  error.  They  found  that  there  were  serious 
r  This  section  relies  heavily  on  the  article  by  Martin  Baily and 
Robert  J.  Gordon  (41. As  the  reader  will  observe,  the  section 
is somewhat  longer  than  the  relative  importance  of measurement 
error  would  seem  to justify.  The  length  of the  section  is justified, 
however,  because  the  examples  of measurement  error  found  by 
Baily and  Gordon  are interesting  in and  of themselves,  especially 
so  to the  financial  services  industries.  Additionally,  the  examples 
should  provide  the  casual  reader  with  a necessary,  but  healthy, 
skepticism  of  economic  data  aggregates. 
Table  I 
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE BUSINESS AND MANUFACTURING SECTORS” 
(Average  percentage  changes  at  annual  rates,  selected  countries) 







United  Kingdom 
United  States 
Business  Mfg.  Business  Mfg.  Business  Mfg. 
5.0  7.2  3.0  5.0  2.4  4.1 
2.9  4.1  2.0  1.2  1.3  1.4 
5.9  6.4  3.5  4.0  2.4  2.5 
4.9  4.8  3.4  3.3  2.0  2.4 
8.6  10.3  3.2  5.2  2.8  6.3 
3.1  5.0  1.9  1.1  1.4  3.0 
3.3  4.1  1.2  0.6  1.9  3.4 
2.2  3.4  0.3  1.0  0.6  3.4 
B  Output  is value  added  in  the  business  (GDP  at  factor  cost  excluding  general  government)  and  manufacturing  sectors  at  constant  prices. 
Productivity  is  labor  productivity  (output  per  employed  person). 
b  The  starting  years  are  as  follows:  Belgium  1962,  Canada  1962,  France  1964,  Germany  1961,  Japan  1967,  Sweden  1964,  United 
Kingdom  1960,  and  United  States  1960. 
Source:  OECD  Economic  Studies, Spring  1988,  p.  20. 
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measured,  but  that,  paradoxically,  the  problems  did 
not  help  to explain  much  of the  slowdown,  basically 
for  two  reasons.  First,  some  of  the  industries  sub- 
ject  to  measurement  error  sell much  of their  output 
to  other  businesses,  so  that  measurement  errors  in 
those  industries  have  less  effect  on  aggregate  pro- 
ductivity  statistics.  Second,  there  were  measurement 
problems  in  earlier  periods  also-growth  is under- 
stated  now,  but  it  was  also  understated  before. 
Baily  and  Gordon  concluded  that  measurement 
error  would  account  for  0.2  percentage  points  of the 
unexplained  one  percentage  point  per year  slowdown 
in  productivity  growth  since  1973.2  They  argued 
persuasively  that  although  the  official  statistics  had 
been  underestimating  productivity  for years  prior  to 
1973,  measurement  error  had  been  getting  worse 
since  1973,  especially  in  the  service  sector. 
Baily  and  Gordon  observed  that  there  was  a 
fundamental  paradox  in the  U.S.  productivity  data, 
namely,  that  the  slow productivity  growth  has  been 
accompanied  by  rapid,  perhaps  even  accelerating, 
technological  change.  They  cited  a  number  of 
technological  advances  in the  services  sector,  many 
of them  emanating  from  the  increased  use  of  com- 
puters,  which  have  revolutionized  the  processing  of 
forms,  payments,  billings,  and  inventory  control. 
The  finance  industry,  for example,  offers  all-in-one 
cash  management  accounts,  automatic  telephone 
machines  for credit  card  approval,  fast bill-paying  by 
phone  or  personal  computer,  and  24-hour  money 
machines.  The  airline  industry  offers  preassigned 
seats  and  boarding  passes,  no-stop  check-ins,  fre- 
quent  flyer  plans,  and  flyer  discounts  aimed  to  the 
nonbusiness  flyer.  As  a  result  of  better  inventory 
control,  retailers  can  stock  a larger  variety  of items 
with  the  same  floor  space.  Drugstore  chains  have 
computerized  prescription  records.  Hotel  chains  have 
frequent-stayer  services,  preprinted  registration 
forms,  and  no-stop  checkout.  Restaurants,  super- 
markets,  and  hospitals  provide  itemized  bills. 
Despite  these  technological  advances,  measured 
productivity  growth  in  the  finance,  insurance,  and 
real  estate  sector  is estimated  to have  declined  at an 
average  rate  of 0.41  percent  per  year  in the  1973-87 
period  after  having  risen  an average  of  1.41  percent 
2  Baily and  Gordon  actually  attributed  0.5 percentage  points  per 
year  to  measurement  error  (0.3  percentage  points  per  year  to 
declining  labor  quality)  because  they  used  a definition  of  total 
factor  productivity  that  put  changes  in labor  quality  into  the  labor 
input.  In  their  framework,  overlooking  a decline  in  the  quality 
of  labor  would  show  up  as  a  measurement  error.  For  this 
article,  however,  declining  labor  quality  is discussed  as a distinct 
source  of  productivity  decline. 
per  year  in the  194873  period.  Productivity  growth 
in retail  trade  averaged  only  one  percent  per  year  in 
1972-86.  Measured  productivity  in the  air transpor- 
tation  industry  also  fell  by  0.2  percent  per  year  in 
197286.  This  last  statistic  might  not  seem  so 
strange,  given  some  of  the  problems  airlines  have 
been  facing.  What  makes  it strange,  however,  is that 
a physical  measure  of productivity-scheduled  airline 
passenger  miles  per  employee-was  rising  substan- 
tially  at  a rate  of  3.6  percent  per  year  at  the  same 
time  that  conventionally-measured  productivity  was 
falling. 
Baily  and  Gordon  concluded  that  there  is a basic 
problem  in measuring  the  productivity  of  services. 
They  also  found  problems  in  the  measurement  of 
productivity  in air transportation  and construction  and 
found  the  productivity  measurements  in trucking  and 
railroad  transportation  to  be  suspicious. 
As  noted  above,  labor  productivity  measures  are 
calculated  by  first  finding  nominal  output,  then 
deflating  that  quantity  by  some  price  index.  The 
resulting  measure  of  real  output  is then  divided  by 
the  number  of  labor  units.  Problems  with  measur- 
ing productivity  almost  invariably  stem  from problems 
in determining  the  right  price  index  to use  to get  real 
output.  This  problem  is particularly  difficult  when 
rapid  technological  changes  have  occurred. 
For  example,  the  personal  computer  used  to write 
this  article  is  8-10  times  faster  and  has  twice  the 
memory  and  four  times  the  hard  disk  space  of  the 
1983  model  that  it replaced.  The  total  package  for 
the  old  computer  cost  almost  $6000  in  1983,  while 
the  new  computer  package  cost  almost  $5000  in 
1988.  If a computer  price  index  merely  compared 
the  prices  of  the  two  machines,  it would  show  that 
computer  prices  in  1988  were  82  percent  of  what 
they  were  in  1983.  In  actuality,  however,  the  new 
personal  computer  is a  quite  different  product.  As 
a  result,  such  a  price  index  would  understate  the 
actual  decline  in computer  prices  since  1983.  A more 
appropriate  measure  would  compare  the  price  of the 
old computer  to  current  prices  of computers  similar 
to the  old  one,  which  sell for  approximately  $1500. 
An index  based  upon  equivalent  quality  computers, 
therefore,  would  conclude  that  prices  in  1988  were 
only  25  percent  of  what  they  were  in  1983.  The 
lesson  is clear:  an appropriate  price  index  must  take 
quality  improvements  into  account. 
In order  to account  for quality  changes  in the  com- 
puter  industry,  the  official  price  deflators  for  com- 
puters  are  derived  in  terms  of  price  per  computer 
“calculation”  rather  than  price  per  computer  “box.” 
Using this measure,  the  Bureau  of Economic  Analysis 
(BEA)  estimated  that  computer  prices  fell  during 
1969-87  at  a  14 percent  annual  rate. 
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propriately  by  this  index  is open  to  debate.  Edward 
Denison  [91 argues that  the  current  treatment  of com- 
puters  results  in  an  oventatement of  productivity 
growth  in manufacturing,  particularly  in nonelectric 
machinery  (which  includes  computers)  since  1979. 
He  observes  that  productivity  measures  that  use 
GNP  as  the  measure  of  output  result  in  a  double 
counting  of the  effects  of computers-once  as invest- 
ment  in  nonelectric  machinery  and  second  as  in- 
termediate  input  embodied  in final product.  He  also 
thinks  the  quality-adjusted  computer  prices  used  by 
the  BEA tend  to overstate  the  industry’s  real output.3 
The  problems  in  estimating  the  output  of  com- 
puters  in times  of rapid  technological  advance  illus- 
trate  the  difficulties  involved  in making  productivity 
estimates  for  the  manufacturing  sector,  where  pro- 
ductivity  is measured  more  accurately  than elsewhere. 
The  difficulties  are  multiplied  when  services  need 
to be  adjusted  for quality  changes.  Baily and  Gordon 
found  a wide  variety  of specific  measurement  prob- 
lems  in  service  industries  such  as  banking  and 
insurance. 
Consider  the  banking  industry.  It had no measured 
productivity  growth  in the  1948-73  period  and  only 
0.05  percent  growth  per  year  in  1973-87.  There  are 
reasons  to  believe,  however,  that  actual  produc- 
tivity  in  banking  has  increased  fairly  substantially 
since  1973.  Improvements  in handling  paper  checks 
and  the  increasing  usage  of electronic  payments,  for 
example,  have  resulted  in substantial  increases  in real 
physical  productivity  in making  payments.  Loan  pro- 
cessing  has  also  become  more  efficient  through  the 
use  of  credit  cards  and  lines  of  credit.  The  sus- 
tained  growth  in check  and  loan-processing  produc- 
tivity  did  not  boost  measured  productivity  in bank- 
ing,  however,  because  individual  activities  are 
weighted  by their  labor  input  shares.  Thus,  the  more 
efficient  activities  such  as credit  card  loans  are  con- 
sidered  to  contribute  less  to  bank  output  than  con- 
ventional  loans  precisely  because  they  utilize  less 
labor. 
Banks  also have  been  providing  customer  conven- 
iences  through  branching  and  24-hour  money  ma- 
chines.  As  a  result,  bank  services  in  1989  are  a 
3  Denison  shows  that  output  per  hour  in  the  total  business 
sector-which  averaged  growth  rates  of 2.9  percent  in  1948-73, 
0.6  percent  in  1973-79,  0.2  percent  in  1979-82,  and  2.2  per- 
cent  in  1982-86-would  have  risen  more  slowly  in  1979-82  (0.1 
percent)  and  1982-86  (1.8  percent)  if it  had  not  been  for  the 
exceptional  productivity  improvement  in computer  production. 
The  slower  productivity  growth,  of course,  lies  entirely  within 
the  manufacturing  sector  in which  growth  rates  of  1.5  percent 
and  5.0 percent  in 1979-82  and  1982-86  are reduced  to  1.0 per- 
cent  and  3.5  percent,  respectively. 
different  (and  considerably  improved)  product  from 
bank  services  in  1970.  Conventional  productivity 
measures,  however,  do  not  consider  convenience  as 
a quality  improvement,  and  branching  is thought  to 
reduce  efficiency-it  reduces  the  average  population 
served  by  a  bank  office. 
As  another  example,  consider  the  insurance  in- 
dustry.  The  price  indexes  used  to  deflate  the 
estimated  value  added  in  particular  sectors  of  this 
industry  are typically  only  loosely  related  to the  true 
insurance  “output.”  For  example,  the  auto  repair  cost 
index  is  used  to  deflate  value  added  by  auto  in- 
surance,  and the  medical  cost  index  is used  to deflate 
the  value  added  by health  insurance.  But  these  pro- 
cedures  lead  to  distortions.  For  example,  because 
medical  costs  are  rising  so  rapidly,  the  practice  of 
deflating  total  value  added  in  the  health  insurance 
sector  almost  certainly  leads  to  an  understating  of 
the  true  growth  of  “output”  in  this  industry  and 
therefore  the  growth  of productivity  in the  industry. 
Baily and Gordon  argue  “. . . given  that  the  insurance 
industry  has been  able  to benefit  not  only  from  com- 
puterization,  but  also  from  group  policies,  it  is im- 
plausible  that  insurance  costs  should  have  risen  faster 
than  the  price  level  for  GNP”  14, p.  396). 
As  a result  of  the  measurement  error  in  banking 
and  insurance  and  some  questionable  practices  in 
measuring  the  deflator  for commercial  rental  income 
in  determining  output  in  real  estate,  Baily  and 
Gordon  concluded  that  the  growth  of productivity 
in the  finance,  insurance,  and  real  estate  sector  was 
probably  understated  by  about  1.1 percent  per  year 
before  1973  and  2.3  percent  per  year  after  1973. 
Productivity  growth  in retail  trade  averaged  1.39 
percent  per year  in 1958-72  and  1  .O percent  per  year 
in  1972-86.  Baily and  Gordon  conclude  that  produc- 
tivity  in this  sector  is mismeasured  because  the  BEA 
trade  deflators  do not  consider  consumer  convenience 
to  be  a quality  improvement,  yet  convenience  has 
been  one  of  the  more  important  trends  in retailing 
in  the  past  two  decades.  Examples  of  the  trend 
toward  consumer  convenience  include  the  prolifer- 
ation  of  sales  catalogs,  fast  food  establishments, 
automatic  teller  machines,  24-hour  convenience 
stores,  liberal  store  opening  and  closing  times,  laser 
scanners  in  supermarkets,  and  supermarkets  that 
stock  more  varieties  of  items. 
There  are rather  large differences  between  produc- 
tivity  in the  transportation  industries  as measured  by 
the  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  and  productivity 
measured  in physical  terms.  The  BEA estimates,  for 
example,  that  productivity  in  the  transportation 
industry  grew  at  an  average  rate  of  3.5  percent  per 
year  in  1948-73  but  only  0.21  percent  per  year  in 
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per  employee  rose  at a fairly  steady  3.3  percent  per 
year  rate  over  the  entire  1948-86  time  period,  show- 
ing no  significant  decline  after  1972.  BEA-measured 
productivity  in  railroads  rose  only  2.2  percent  per 
year  in  1973-86,  but  railroad  freight  ton-miles  per 
employee  rose  5.5  percent  per  year.  BEA-measured 
trucking  productivity  fell  0.3  percent  per  year  over 
the  1973-86  period,  while intercity  trucking  ton-miles 
per  employee  rose  2.3 percent  per year  over  the  same 
period.  Airline productivity,  as measured  by the  BEA, 
fell  0.4  percent  per  year  over  the  1973-86  period, 
but  scheduled  airline  passenger  miles  per  employee 
rose  at  a  3.8  percent  rate. 
Although  Baily and  Gordon  did not  determine  the 
cause  of the  discrepancies  in railroads  and  trucking, 
they  found  that  airline productivity  was mismeasured 
because  the  official  statistics  did not  take  account  of 
airline  discounts.  The  official  BEA  price  deflator 
showed  fares  almost  tripling  between  1972 and  1986, 
but  actual  revenue  collected  per  passenger  mile  in- 
creased  only  about  60 percent.  A correction  of that 
statistic  will result  in a marked  increase  in measured 
airline  productivity. 
Baily and  Gordon  concluded  that  productivity  has 
probably  been  understated  in  the  construction  in- 
dustry.  The  official  data  indicate  that  construction 
value  added  per  hour  fell  4.7  percent  per  year  be- 
tween  1967  and  1972,  and  fell  again  at  a  2.2  per- 
cent  per  year  rate  between  1977  and  1986.  Thus, 
between  1967  and  1986  measured  real  value  added 
in construction  fell by  12 percent  despite  a 40  per- 
cent  rise  in  hours  worked. 
Baily  and  Gordon  argued  that  real  value  added  in 
construction  has probably  been  mismeasured  because 
the  price  indexes  used  to  deflate  nominal  value 
added  by  construction  allowed  for  virtually  no  in- 
crease  in quality  of output  per  square  foot,  either  for 
residential  or for nonresidential  construction.  In fact, 
the  price  deflators  for construction  have  assumed  no 
increase  in  quality  per  square  foot  since  1929. 
As  Baily  and  Gordon  noted,  price  indexes  based 
upon  square  footages  can  be  biased  if new  features 
are  included  in houses  of a particular  size.  Features 
new  to  residential  construction  since  1929  include 
central  air conditioning,  double-glazed  windows,  wall 
insulation,  customized  features,  built-in  dishwashers, 
and  more  attention  to landscaping.  Features  new  to 
nonresidential  construction  include  faster  elevators, 
more  sophisticated  heating  and  air  conditioning 
systems,  and  intermediate  layers  between  floors  to 
allow more  flexibility  and access  for electric  lines  and 
cooling  ducts. 
Labor  Quality 
Baily and Gordon  attributed  0.3  percentage  points 
per year  of the  slowdown  in U.S.  productivity  growth 
since  1973  to mismeasurement  of labor  quality.  The 
study  of productivity  and  U.S.  economic  growth  by 
Jorgenson,  Gollop,  and  Fraumeni  [ 171 concluded,  as 
shown  in Table  II,  that  deteriorating  labor  quality 
had accounted  for an even  greater  decline  of 0.63  per- 
centage  points  per  year  in the  growth  of U.S.  pro- 
ductivity  in  1973-79.  Edward  Denison,  on the  other 
hand,  concluded  that  changes  in the  quality  of  the 
labor force  contributed  only  a tiny  amount  to the  pro- 
ductivity  slowdown  (lo]. 
The  Jorgenson,  Gollop,  and  Fraumeni  study  de- 
composed  labor  quality  by  source  (age,  sex,  educa- 
tion,  employment  class,  and occupation;  and various 
interaction  measures)  by  industry.  This  decomposi- 
tion  enabled  them  to  estimate  the  effects  of  these 
factors  on  labor  quality  (using  compensation  re- 
ceived  as  a proxy  for  quality).  They  found  that 
the  age  and  sex  factors  are  .  .  .  the  dominant  causes  of 
slowing  growth  of  the  quality  index,  [but]  .  .  .  the  inter- 
action  effects  of  age  and  sex  with  each  other  and  other 
factors  are  generally  positive  and  consequently  reduce  the 
negative  effect  of  .  .  .  [ -0.62)  percent  that  would  be 
inferred  from  summing  the  main  effects  of  sex  and  age, 
.  .  .  [ -0.35)  percent  and  .  .  .  [ -0.271  percent,  respec- 
tively  . . . . Yet  even  when  all interaction  effects  are  taken 
into  account,  the  conclusion  remains  that  the  changing 
sex-age  composition  of  the  employed  labor  force  has  had 
a  negative  impact  on  labor  input  per  hour  worked.  The 
increasing  entry  of  women  and  young  workers  into  low- 
paying  jobs  increases  hours  worked  proportionately  more 
than  it  increases  labor  input  (17,  p.  2911. 
Table  II 
ESTIMATES OF LABOR QUALITY 
(Average  annual  rates  of  growth) 
Source  of  Quality  1948-73  1973-79  Difference 
Percent  Percent  Cal.  2-Cal.  1 
Overall  quality  0.61  -0.02  -  0.63 
Sex  -0.19  -0.54  -  0.35 
Age  -0.07  -0.34  -0.27 
Education  0.66  0.36  -0.30 
Employment  class  0.17  -0.22  -0.39 
Occupation  0.37  0.00  -0.37 
industry  0.28  0.08  -0.20 
Source:  Derived  from  Jorgenson,  Gallop,  and  Fraumeni  [17,  p.  2731. 
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of the  decline  in labor quality  after  1973 resulted  from 
a  diminished  return  to  education. 
There  has  been  an  ongoing  discussion  in  the 
economics  literature  of the  likelihood  that  the  decline 
in  the  return  to  education  stems  from  a  decline  in 
the  quality  of schooling-for  example,  as evidenced 
by  the  decline  in the  SAT  scores  that  began  in the 
1960s.  Baily’s  1981  study  [l]  of  the  SAT  score 
decline  concluded  that  it could  not  have  contributed 
to the post-1973  U.S.  productivity  slowdown  because 
the  decline  was  not  large  enough  and  the  new  en- 
trants  to  the  labor  force  did  not  make  up  a  large 
enough  fraction  of the  work  force.  A 1987  study  by 
John  Bishop  [6] using  not  only  the  SAT  scores  but 
a variety  of measures  of general  intellectual  achieve- 
ment  (GIA)  concluded  that  although  the  decline  in 
the  scores  after  1967 could  not  explain  the post-1973 
slowdown,  it probably  did contribute  to weak  growth 
in the  1980s.  That  study  estimated  that  the  reduc- 
tion  in  GIA  reduced  productivity  growth  by  about 
0.09  percent  per  year  in  1973-80  and  0.24  percent 
per  year  during  1980-87  (6,  p.  161. 
Richard  J.  Murname  [18]  agreed  with  Baily  that 
a decline  in educational  quality  was  not  responsible 
for  the  productivity  decline.  He  stated  that 
both  private  and  public  reports  have  sounded  the  alarm 
that  the  nation  is  at  risk  because  of  the  inadequacies  of 
American  education.  These  studies,  in turn,  have  prompted 
observers  to  conclude  that  deterioration  in  America’s 
schools  has  been  a  significant  cause  of  the  drop  in  the 
productivity  growth  rate  over  the  past  fifteen  years.  That 
conclusion  is  almost  certainly  not  true.  The  productivity 
decline,  especially  the  dramatic  drop  beginning  in  1973, 
was  too  precipitous  to  blame  on  relatively  slow-moving 
changes  such  as  a possible  reduction  in  the  quality  of  the 
work  force.  There  were  some  declines  in  scores  on  tests 
administered  to elementary  and  secondary  school  students 
during  the  late  1960s  and  1970s  that  are  not  well  under- 
stood,  but  a large  part  of  the  decline  in  the  SAT  scores, 
the  measures  of  educational  performance  given  the  most 
attention  in the  media  is due  to  an  increase  in the  number 
of  students  with  relatively  low  ability  who  are  taking  the 
test.  Perhaps  most  important,  the  rate  of labor  productivity 
growth  has  also  fallen  in other  countries,  including  France, 
Germany,  Britain,  and Japan,  since  1973  118, pp.  ‘215163. 
Murname  also noted  the  importance  of workplace 
organization  to  productivity.  He  observed  that  the 
productivity  of  American  workers  in  the  recent 
General  Motors-Toyota  NUMMI  automobile  project 
rivaled  the  productivity  of workers  in Toyota  plants 
in Japan  after  two  years,  mainly  because  of the  use 
of the  Japanese  management  system.  This  manage- 
ment  system  included  such  things  as worker  teams 
responsible  for  quality  control,  a just-in-time  inven- 
tory  system,  and  team  standardization  of tasks.  This 
increase  in productivity  was  particularly  significant 
as  GM  had  previously  closed  down  the  plant  and 
eighty  percent  of  the  labor  force  used  in  the  joint 
venture  consisted  of workers  previously  laid off. This 
example  also  calls  into  question  the  assertion  that 
the  U.S.  worker  is  of  a  relatively  low  quality. 
Murname  is, however,  concerned  about  the  effects 
of education  on future  productivity.  He  observed  that 
the  skills that  seem  particularly  important  to worker 
productivity  are 
. . . the  ability  to  understand  directions  (even  when  the 
manuals  are poorly  written),  to  ask  questions,  to  assimilate 
and  synthesize  unfamiliar  information,  and  to  identify  and 
solve  problems  that  occur  during  the  normal  working  day; 
in  short,  literacy  and  problem-solving  skills  in  specific 
contexts  118, p.  2231. 
He  cited  studies  that  show  Americans  may  not  be 
acquiring  these  basic  skills,  in particular,  the  1986 
study  for  the  National  Assessment  of  Educational 
Progress  (NAEP),  which  found  that  while  90  per- 
cent  of 2 l-25  year  old American  adults  could  follow 
simple  directions  and  solve  single  step  problems, 
more  than  30 percent  had  difficulty  with  nonroutine 
or  multistep  problems.  The  item  scores  indicated, 
moreover,  that  the  problem  was  not  basic  reading 
skills  but  an  inability  to  use  reading  to  solve  multi- 
step  problems.  The  1986 NAEP  mathematics  assess- 
ment  concluded  about  American  students’  math 
skills,  a proxy  for  their  problem-solving  skills,  that 
the  fact  that  nearly  half  of  the  17-year-olds  do  not  have 
mathematical  skills  beyond  basic  computation  with  whole 
numbers  has serious  implications.  With  such  limited  mathe- 
matical  abilities,  these  students  nearing  graduation  are 
unlikely  to  be  able  to  match  mathematical  tools  to  the 
demands  of  various  problem  situations  that  permeate  life 
and  work  (18,  p.  225J. 
Murname  had  several  suggestions  for  improving 
the  U.S.  educational  system.  One  of  the  more  in- 
teresting  was that since  the types  of achievement  tests 
most  often  used  by  districts  and  states  create  incen- 
tives  for  teachers  to  focus  instruction  on  arithmetic 
computation  skills and word  recognition  skills rather 
than  on the  more  difficult  to  assess  problem-solving 
and literacy  skills, the  achievement  tests  should  either 
be modified  or given less weight  in teacher  evaluation. 
Higher Energy Prices after 1973 
The  effect  of the  higher  energy  prices  on produc- 
tivity  growth  is one  of the  more  hotly  debated  topics 
in the  economics  literature.  A number  of economists 
think  that  increases  in such  prices  after  1973  had  a 
major  effect  on worldwide  productivity  growth,  while 
others  think  energy  played  a relatively  minor  role. 
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prices  after  1973 were  important  determinants  of the 
productivity  slowdown.  Jorgenson’s  study  disag- 
gregated  the  economy  into  sectors  and  then  further 
broke  down  sectoral  output  growth  into  separate 
source  components,  namely,  labor  inputs,  capital 
inputs,  intermediate  materials  inputs,  and  produc- 
tivity.  These  steps  enabled  him  to  study  the 
characteristics  of  productivity  growth  by  industry. 
In an earlier  study  [ 161, Jorgenson  and  Fraumeni 
had  classified  productivity-growth  in 35  major  U.S. 
industries  as capital  saving  or using,  labor  saving  or 
using,  energy  saving  or using,  or materials  saving  or 
using.  These  classifications  are useful  for  determin- 
ing  the  effects  of  relative  price  increases  of  the 
various  factor  inputs  on  productivity  growth.  If,  for 
example,  an industry’s  productivity  growth  was capital 
using,  an increase  in the  price  of capital  would  lead 
to  a slowdown  in productivity  growth,  but  if the  in- 
dustry’s  productivity  growth  was  capital  saving,  in- 
creased  capital  prices  would  increase  productivity 
growth  in  that  industry. 
Jorgenson  and  Fraumeni  found  the  most  common 
type  of  productivity  growth,  in  19  of  the  35  in- 
dustries,  to  have  been  capital  using,  labor  using, 
energy  using,  and  materials  saving.  They  also found 
that  productivity  growth  was enw  using in 29 of the 
3.5 industries  studied.  This  last finding  implied  that 
increases  in  energy  prices  cause  reductions  in  ag- 
gregate  productivity  growth. 
Jorgenson  [  1.51  argued  that the  most  striking  change 
in  the  relative  prices  of  capital,  labor,  energy,  and 
materials  inputs  after  1973  was  the  substantial  in- 
crease  in  the  price  of  energy.  He  pointed  out  that 
real  energy  prices  rose  23  percent  in  1973-75  and 
34  percent  in  the  two  years  following  the  Iranian 
revolution  in  1978.  He  concluded  that 
this  evidence  provides  part  of the  solution  to  the  problem 
of disappointing  U.S.  economic  growth  since  1973.  Higher 
energy  prices  are  associated  with  a  decline  in  sectoral 
productivity  growth  for  29  of  the  35  industries  [studied]. 
.  .  .  The  resulting  slowdown  in  sectoral  productivity 
growth  is  more  than  sufficient  to  explain  the  decline  in 
U.S.  economic  growth  115, p.  341. 
Zvi  Griliches  [14]  also  agreed  that  energy  is the 
prime  suspect  as a cause  of  the  post-1973  produc- 
tivity  slowdown.  He  stated  that 
it  is  not  just  that  many  industries  had  to  face  new  prices, 
change  the  way  they  used  their  factors  of production,  and 
scrap  much  of  their  now  unprofitable  capacity,  but  there 
was  also  a long  worldwide  recession  induced  by  the  fall in 
real  wealth  caused  by  OPEC,  by  the  fall in  aggregate  de- 
mand  caused  by  governments  trying  to  control  the  result- 
ing  inflation,  and  the  subsequent  fall  in  U.S.  exports  and 
the  increase  in  import  competition  in  the  early  1980s  as 
the  result  of  rising  dollar  exchange  rates.  These  factors 
combined  together  to produce  one  of the  longest  worldwide 
recessions  and  growth  slowdowns  from  which  the  world  may 
not  yet  have  emerged  [14,  p.  191. 
Some  economists  argue  that  energy  played  a 
smaller  role  in  the  productivity  slowdown.  Those 
economists  point  to  discrepancies  between  the  tim- 
ing  of  the  oil  price  increases  and  the  productivity 
slowdowns  in  oil-related  industries.  As  Baily  and 
Gordon  put  it, 
at  first  glance,  industry  productivity  data  suggest  that  the 
increase  in energy  prices  in  1973  had  an effect  on  produc- 
tivity.  Mining  and  utilities,  two  of  the  industries  most 
heavily  affected  by  the  energy  crisis,  had  the  biggest  post- 
1973  slowdowns.  Transportation,  too,  had  a major  slow- 
down.  On  closer  inspection,  however,  the  impact  of energy 
is not  so clear.  Both  mining  and  utilities  had  begun  to  slow 
down  before  1973.  The  depletion  of  easily  available  oil 
reserves  in  oil  extraction,  health  and  safety  regulations  in 
coal  mining,  and  the  depletion  of innovation  and  returns  to 
scale  opportunities  in  electric  power,  together  with  the 
effect  of environmental  regulations,  were  reducing  growth 
before  the  energy  crisis  hit.  In  the  transportation  sector, 
too,  the  timing  seems  a little  off.  This  sector  slowed  less 
after  1973  than  it  did  after  1979,  a  period  when  energy 
prices  began  to  come  down  [4,  pp.  362-631. 
Mancur  Olson  [ZO] disputes  this  point.  Although 
he agrees  that  the  productivity  growth  began  to slow 
slightly  before  the  first  oil  shock  (1973),  he  argues 
that  all studies  show  the  dramatic  drop  in  produc- 
tivity  growth  in  1973.  As  a  result,  he  dismisses 
arguments  about  modest  timing  discrepancies. 
Englander  and Mittelstadt  [ 121, writing  for  OECD 
Economic Stlldies, however,  also  dismiss  energy  as a 
prime  cause  of the  worldwide  productivity  slowdown. 
They  find  a high  elasticity  of  substitution  between 
energy  and  other  factors  of  production  in  OECD 
countries,  excepting  Japan  where  there  was evidence 
of  complementarity  between  energy  and  capital  in 
the  seventies  and  early  eighties. 
In  sum,  there  is  debate  about  the  effects  of  the 
sharp run-up  in oil prices  on productivity  growth.  The 
Griliches-Jorgenson  arguments  seem  most  com- 
pelling,  however,  and  the  rise  in oil prices  seems  to 
have  almost  certainly  played  some  role  in  the  pro- 
ductivity  slowdown. 
Environmental Protection Regulations 
Governmental  regulations,  environmental  and 
otherwise,  have  also  been  thought  to  contribute  to 
the  U.S.  productivity  slowdown,4  although  as with 
4  Discussion  here  is  based  upon  output  as  normally  defined. 
Some  economists  argue  that  clean  air  and  clean  water  are 
themselves  goods  that  should  be  included  in output.  If so,  the 
discussion  in this  section  should  be  made  part  of the  section  on 
measurement  error. 
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debate. 
A  1986  study  by  Anthony  Barbera  and  Virginia 
McConnell  [S] found  that  estimates  of the  aggregate 
productivity  decline  in the  1970s  resulting  from  en- 
vironmental  regulations  ranged  from  0.1  to  0.35 
percentage  points  annually.  The  study  found  the 
largest  effects  of pollution  abatement  regulations  in 
the  chemicals;  stone,  clay  and  glass;  and  primary 
metals  industries.  Along the  same  lines,  a 1983  study 
by  Frank  Gollop  and  Mark  Roberts  (131 estimated 
the  1970  Clean  Air Act to have  reduced  the  produc- 
tivity  growth  of fossil-fueled  electric  utilities  by  i3.59 
percentage  points  per  year  in  1973-79  period. 
A recent  study  by  Klaus  Conrad  and  Catherine  J. 
Morrison  18) examined  the  effects  of mandated  pollu- 
tion  abatement  investment  on  productivity  in  the 
United  States,  Canada,  and Japan.  They  found  that 
pollution  abatement  expenses  reduced  U.S.  produc- 
tivity  growth  by  0.223  percentage  points  in 1973-80. 
Their  results  are  shown  in more  detail  in Table  III. 
Depletion  of Mineral Resources and 
Investment Opportunities 
William  Nordhaus  stated  in  1982  [ 191 that  about 
65  percent  of  the  U.S.  productivity  slowdown  in 
1973-79  could  be  attributed  to  depletion  of mineral 
resources  and investment  opportunities.  With  respect 
to  the  depletion  of  mineral  resources,  he  observed 
that  total  factor  productivity  in  mining  (principally 
oil and gas) in the  U.S.  grew  at 2.6  percent  annually 
during  1948-73,  then  declined  at  a  2.8  percent 
annual  rate  from  1973-79.  He  also  noted  that  there 
Table  III 
PRODUCTIVITY”  GROWTH  ADJUSTED FOR 
POLLUTION ABATEMENT EXPENSES 
1967-73  1973-80 
Canada 
Traditional  measure  0.229 
Adjusted  0.278 
Germany 
Traditional  measure  2.855 
Adjusted  2.963 
United  States 
Traditional  measure  2.661  1.565 
Adjusted  2.743  1.788 
a Total  factor  productivity. 
Source:  Conrad  and  Morrison  t8,  p.  6921. 
had  been  a break  in the  trend  rate  of finding  oil and 
gas after  1973.  With  respect  to a depletion  of invest- 
ment  opportunities,  Nordhaus  cited  a dearth  of great 
inventions  (telephone,  automobile,  rayon,  airplane, 
computer,  transistor,  etc.)  in  recent  years  and  a 
decline  in  patent  applications  in  the  seventies. 
Whether  there  has  been  a  depletion  in  mineral 
resources  seems  debatable  from  the  perspective  of 
1989,  although  it may have  seemed  plausible  in 1982. 
The  idea  of a depletion  of investment  opportunities, 
however,  seems  quite  implausible  today.  As noted 
earlier,  Baily  and  Gordon  observed  quite  rapid 
technological  progress  in the  U.S.,  mainly  resulting 
from  the  continuing  computer  revolution. 
It  is true  that  patent  applications  declined  in  the 
seventies.  In  1970,  there  were  76,000  patent  applica- 
tions  in  the  U.S.  while  there  were  only  59,000  in 
1983.  This  decline  does  not  necessarily  indicate  an 
exhaustion  of new  invention  opportunities,  however. 
As  Zvi  Griliches  pointed  out, 
. . . [patent  applications]  are  heavily  influenced  by  eco- 
nomic  conditions  and  prospects.  .  .  . Patent  applications, 
for example,  fell sharply  in the  193Os, recovered  in the  late 
1940s  and  were  essentially  flat  from  the  early  1950s 
through  the  early  1960s.  They  rose  sharply  in  the  late 
1960s  and  then  basically  flattened  out  throughout  the 
197Os,  starting  to  rise  a bit  in the  1980s.  Most  of the  rise 
in  patent  applications  in  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s 
came  from  a major  rise  in  applications  from  abroad  which 
effectively  crowded  out  a  significant  number  of  U.S. 
patents,  given  the  relatively  fixed  resource  level  available 
to  the  U.S.  Patent  Office  for  processing  such  applications 
(14,  p.  161. 
Griliches  added  that  the  data  on  R&D  expendi- 
tures  and  the  technological  news  in  the  daily 
newspapers  do  not  support  the  exhaustion 
hypothesis. 
Summary 
As  is  obvious,  there  are  a  number  of  potential 
explanations  for  the  post-1973  productivity  slow- 
down,  and the  experts  differ  on the  relative  contribu- 
tions  of each  explanation.  The  views  of the  experts 
on  the  contributions  are  summarized  in Table  IV. 
II. 
U.S.  PRODUCTIVITY  COMPARED  TO 
JAPAN AND GERMANY 
The  slowdown  in productivity  growth  since  1973, 
as noted  at the  outset,  has been  worldwide.  But pro- 
ductivity  growth  in the  United  States  has  also been 
relatively  slower  since  1973  than  it has been  in Ger- 
many,  Japan,  and selected  other  developed  countries, 
as Table  I shows.  U.S.  productivity  growth  has been 
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SOURCES  OF  THE  PRODUCTIVITY  SLOWDOWN, 
ACCORDING  TO  THE  EXPERTS 
Percentage 
Points  Per 









End  of shift  from  low  productivity  farm  and  self- 
employed  jobs  to  higher  productivity  nonfarm 
jobs.  Denison  [lOI. 
Effects  of  1973-75  and  1980-82  recessions. 
Denison  1101. 
Declining  labor  quality.  Baily  and  Gordon  141. 
Declining  labor  quality.  Jorgenson,  Gollop,  and 
Fraumeni  [171. 
Measurement  error.  Baily  and  Gordon  141. 
Pollution  abatement  expenses.  Conrad  and  Mor- 
rison  [81. 
Depletion  of  mineral  resources  and  investment 
opportunities.  Nordhaus  [191. 
Rising  energy  prices. 
1141,  ‘Jorgenson  H.51, 
Baily  and  Gordon  141, 
stadt  t121. 
Substantial-Griliches 
Olson  1201.  Modest- 
Englander  and  Mittel- 
especially  slow relative  to Germany  and Japan,  which 
experienced  trend  growth  rates  in 1979-86  of 2.0 per- 
cent  and  2.8  percent  respectively. 
Volumes  have  been  written  on  the  causes  of  the 
variances  between  productivity  growth  rates  in  the 
U.S.  and  those  of  Germany  and  Japan.  It  is widely 
recognized,  for  example,  that  Germany  and  Japan 
have  different  cultures  and  their  citizens  have  work 
ethics  that  differ  from  those  of  American  workers. 
The  school  systems  are  different  and  students  are 
trained  differently.  The  Japanese  management  style 
is  also  different  and  according  to  many  observers 
relatively  more  efficient  than  the  traditional  American 
managerial  style.  All  of  these  differences  are  likely 
to  contribute  to  the  variances  in  national  produc- 
tivity  growth  rates. 
Baily  and  Blair  [Z] examined  whether  the  relative 
slowness  in U.S.  productivity  growth  can  be  attrib- 
uted  to a relative  inefficiency  of American  managers. 
They  observed  that  when  American  managers  have 
been  able  to implement  the  Japanese  team  manage- 
ment  systems,  as in the  Toyota-GM  NUMMI  plant 
in  California,  American  workers  have  been  able  to 
achieve  productivity  comparable  to the  Toyota  plant 
in  Japan.  On  the  other  hand,  they  noted  that  a 
number  of American  managers  have  had  substantial 
difficulty  in  implementing  the  Japanese  model. 
Moreover,  they  show  that  criticisms  of  American 
management  practices  extend  beyond  the  automobile 
industry. 
Lester  Thurow,  the  dean  of the  Sloan  School  of  Manage- 
ment,  argues  that  American  managers  have  failed  to  com- 
mercialize  new  technologies,  pointing  to  the  fact  that  U.S. 
companies  missed  out  entirely  on  the  VCR  revolution,  even 
though  the  original  technology  was  developed  in the  United 
States.  More  recently,  many  companies-in  and  out  of the 
auto industry-have  failed to adopt  the Just-in-Time  produc- 
tion  system  developed  by  Toyota,  a system  that  is  much 
more  than  a  way  of  saving  inventory;  it  is  a  cost-saving 
reorganization  of the  entire  system  of production  that  forces 
workers  to  become  much  more  conscious  of the  quality  of 
each  component  [Z, p.  1901. 
Baily  and  Blair were  careful  to  note  that  the  fore- 
going  criticisms  of American  management  practices 
are  not  universally  shared.  Defenders  of American 
management  have  pointed  out  that  although  U.S.  ex- 
ports  in the  1980s  suffered  as  a result  of the  over- 
valued  dollar,  export  shares  of American  multinational 
companies  have  remained  strong.  The  ability of U.S. 
owned  enterprises  to remain  competitive  throughout 
this  period,  the  defenders  argue,  is a sign  of healthy 
management.  Also, 
. . . the  fact  that  some  U.S.  industries  have  had  trouble 
competing  in world  markets  does  not  necessarily  mean  that 
American  managers  are deficient  overall.  For  example,  there 
are  many  industries-including  agriculture,  chemicals,  and 
package  express  delivery-in  which  productivity  in Japan  is 
lower  than  in  the  United  States  (2,  p.1911. 
As  a result,  Baily  and  Blair  concluded  that  “.  .  . 
the  evidence  is not  definitive  in showing  either  that 
management  quality  deteriorated  or that  management 
caused  the  slowdown  in U.S.  productivity  growth’ 
(2, p.  1931. The y argued,  however,  that  management 
practices  in the  United  States  still are a matter  of con- 
cern,  for the  competitive  and  regulatory  structure  in 
U.S.  industry  does  not  provide  proper  incentives  for 
innovation  and  productivity  improvement.  They 
cited,  as a basic  description  of how  American  com- 
panies  deal  with  competitors,  a portion  of Michael 
Porter’s  book,  Competitive  Strategy: 
. . . in most  industries  a central  characteristic  of competition 
is that  firms  are  mutually  dependent.  . . . In  this  situation, 
.  .  . the  outcome  of  a  competitive  move  by  one  firm  de- 
pends  at least  to  some  extent  on  the  reactions  of its  rivals. 
.  .  . Thus  success  can  be  assured  only  if the  comperitors 
choose  to or are  influenced  to respond  in a non-destructive 
way  121, p.  881. 
As a result  of this  view  of competitors,  Baily  and 
Blair argued  that  American  firms  have  been  unwill- 
ing  to  engage  in  aggressive  competition  with  their 
18  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JULY/AUGUST  1989 rivals, while Japanese  firms have  often  used  aggressive 
price-cutting  tactics.  Indeed,  they  argued  that  such 
tactics  are typical  of Japan’s  strategy  for moving  into 
foreign  markets.  In  contrast,  Baily  and  Blair argued 
that  “.  . . U.S.  companies  . . . have  been  unwilling 
to use price-cutting  as a form  of investment  to forestall 
the  entry  of  rivals”  [Z,  p.  1951,  believing  that  “ag- 
gressive  price  competition  in  the  markets  for  new 
products  will . . . sharply  reduce  the  return  to  inno- 
vation  by  [rapidly]  eliminating  any  return  in excess 
of the  cost  of production”  [Z, p.  1971. Baily and Blair 
also observed,  citing U.S.  laws against predatory  pric- 
ing and  dumping,  that  “. . . opposition  to aggressive 
competition  is enshrined  in  U.S.  law”  [Z, p.  1951. 
In the  past,  when  Japanese  firms  relied  heavily  on 
technology  from  the  U.S.,  they  were  able  to  avoid 
the  aforementioned  trade-off  between  competition 
and innovation.  Now,  when  Japan  spends  heavily  on 
research  and  development  (R&D),  Japan  meets  the 
challenge  of combining  competition  with  innovation 
by setting  government  limits on competition.  As Baily 
and  Blair  put  it, 
the  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Trade  (MITI)  encouraged 
companies  to  allocate  opportunities  for technology  develop- 
ment.  One  company  would  develop  technology  aimed  for 
one  part  of the  market,  while  another  firm  aimed  at another 
part.  This  process  increased  the  overall  efficiency  of R&D 
by  reducing  the  duplication  of  research  efforts  and  by 
allowing  innovators  to gain  at least  a temporary  monopoly. 
. . . Equally  significant,  Japanese  companies  have  been  able 
to appropriate  more  of the  return  to their  R&D  by directing 
a greater  share  to  the  development  of new  processes  than 
their  U.S.  counterparts-.  . . it is easier  to  keep  the  details 
of  a  new  process  secret  (and  thus  to  keep  technological 
developments  from  flowing  back  to  the  U.S.).  . . . Finally, 
in  situations  in  which  Japanese  groups  have  successfully 
limited  their  domestic  competition,  perhaps  with  help  from 
MITI,  companies  have  been  able  to earn  their  target  return 
on  R&D  at  home.  But  then  the  government  encourages 
Japanese  companies  to  compete  abroad  12, p.  1991. 
Baily  and  Blair  concluded  that  the  United  States 
could  learn  important  lessons  from Japan’s treatment 
of returns  to innovation.  They  argued  that  U.S.  anti- 
trust  enforcers  should  learn  that  bigness  is not  in itself 
bad.  They  also  observed  that  Japan  has  found  that 
aggressive  competition  in world  markets  has greatly 
encouraged  cost  cutting  and  quality  enhancement. 
On  the  other  hand,  they  did  not  advocate  that  the 
U.S.  government  allocate  research  initiatives  among 
competing  companies,  observing  that  the  costs  of a 
misdirected  industrial  policy  can  be very  high indeed. 
Rohlen  [22]  compared  Japanese  and  American 
school  systems  and  noted  that  a higher  percentage 
of students  in Japan  graduate  from  high  school  and 
that  scores  on  achievement  tests  indicate  that 
Japanese  students  have  higher  language  and  math 
skills  than  American  students.  And  Murname  ob- 
served  that 
recent  studies  comparing  the  mathematics  skills of American 
middle-class  children  with  middle-class  children  growing  up 
in Japan  and Taiwan  indicate  similar  skill levels  among  first 
graders,  but  markedly  lower  performance  by American  fifth 
graders  118, p.  227). 
Other  sources  of  the  United  States’  productivity 
lag might  include  the  relatively  higher  rates  of overall 
investment  in  Germany  and  Japan,  the  relatively 
more  rapid  growth  of nondefense  R&D  investment 
in those  countries,  the  effects  of more  stringent  pollu- 
tion controls  in the  United  States,  and relatively  more 
measurement  error  in the  U.S.  data.  Tables  III and 
V provide  information  relevant  to these  possibilities. 
Chart  3 shows  private  fixed  investment  as a per- 
cent  of  GNP  in Japan,  Germany,  and  the  United 
States.  The  chart  shows  that  the  U.S.  figure  is per- 
sistently  smaller.  Table  V shows  that  total U.S.  R&D 
spending  as  a  percent  of  gross  domestic  product5 
(GDP)  has  been  relatively  high  in  comparison  to 
other  countries.  The  U.S.‘s  2.83  percent  in 1985 led 
all others  shown.  A more  relevant  statistic,  however, 
may  be  the  nondefense R&D  spending  as a percent 
of GDP.  According  to that  statistic,  the  United  States 
spends  a substantially  smaller  percentage  of its pro- 
duct  on  R&D  than  either  Japan  or  Germany.  As 
Table  VI  shows,  Japan  had  almost  four  times  the 
number  of  U.S.  patent  applications  in  1983. 
Table  III provides  estimates  of productivity  growth 
adjusted  for  mandated  pollution  abatement  invest- 
ment.  The  table  shows  that  measured  U.S.  produc- 
5  Gross  domestic  product  is market  value  of  output  produced 
by  factors  of  production  located  in  a country.  By  comparison, 
gross  national  nroduct  (GNP)  is the  market  value  of outout  oro- 
duced  by  factors  of production  owned by  citizens  of a lountry. 
Chart  3  GROSS  PRIVATE DOMESTIC 
FIXED  INVESTMENT 
Percent  As  a  Percent  of  GNP 
281  A  I 
18  ..*  .  ..-.. 
,6  “X,  ,/’ 
‘\.-” 
14)  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’  I  ’  ’  ’  1 
1973  ‘75  977  ‘79  ‘81  ‘a3  935  ‘87 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  19 Table  V 
RESEARCH  AND  DEVELOPMENT  EXPENDITURES 
ASAPERCENTOFGDP 
(Selected  countries,  selected  years) 
TOTAL 
COUfltN  1965  1975  1985 
United  States  2.76  2.32  2.83 
Japan  1.55  2.01  2.61  _ 
Germany  1.60  2.24  2.66 
France  2.03  1.80  2.31 
United  Kingdom  2.30  2.03  2.32 
NONDEFENSE 
Countnr  1971  1975  1984 
United  States  1.68  1.72  1.82 
Japan  1.84  2.00  2.64 
Germany  2.03  2.10  2.47 
France  1.46  1.46  1.79 
United  Kingdom  1.50  1.32  1.61 
Source:  OECD  Economic  Studies, Spring  1988.  pp.  36-37. 
tivity  growth  would  have  been  0.223  percentage 
points  higher  in  1973-80  had  it  not  beenfor  man- 
dated  pollution  abatement  investment.  The  table  also 
shows  that  German  productivity  would  have  been 
only  0.108  percentage  points  higher  per  year.  Thus, 
Table  VI 
TOTAL  PATENT  APPLICATIONS 
1965  1975  1980  _--- 
lY83 
What  causes  the  U.S.  to  lag  behind 
Japan  and  Germany  in  productivity 
growth?  Cultural  differences?  Undoubt- 
the  data  imply  that  German  pollution  abatement 
regulations  had  a slightly  smaller  effect  on  produc- 
tivity  growth  than  U.S.  regulations. 
Finally,  there  is a possibility  that  productivity  is 
measured  more  poorly  in the  U.S.  than  it is in Japan 
and  Germany.  The  author  has  seen  no  study  of 
Japanese  and  German  data  comparable  to  the  Baily 
and  Gordon  study  of productivity  measurement  in 
the  U.S.,  but  there  is no  reason  to  believe  that  the 
Japanese  and Germans  would  ignore  airline discounts, 
and  allow  for  no  quality  improvements  in construc- 
tion.  More  significantly,  the  difficult  measurement 
problems  for productivity  statistics  stem  from  meas- 
urement  of  the  productivity  of  services.  Chart  4 
shows  construction,  transportation,  and  services  as 
a percent  of  GDP  in the  United  States,  Japan,  and 
Germany.  The  chart  shows  that  a substantially  larger 
portion  of  U.S.  GDP  stems  from  those  sectors- 
sectors  in  which  productivity  is  more  likely  to  be 
mismeasured.  For  this reason,  U.S.  productivity  data 
probably  contain  relatively  more  measurement  error. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The  conclusion  is that  there  is not  any  one  cause 
of the  U.S.  productivity  slowdown.  Nor  is there  a 
single  explanation  of  the  slowness  of  U.S.  produc- 
tivity  growth  relative  to  other  countries.  Based  on 
the  research  surveyed  in this  article,  however,  one 
can  make  educated  guesses  on  the  relative  impor- 
tance  of  some  of  the  factors. 
What  contributed  to  the  measured  slowdown  in 
U.S.  productivity  growth?  Oil  prices?  Very  likely. 
Mismeasurement?  Very  likely.  Government  regula- 
tions?  Probably.  A decline  in labor  quality?  Perhaps. 
Depletion  of  mineral  resources?  Doubt- 
ful.  Depletion  of  investment  oppor- 
tunities?  Doubtful. 
United  States  72,317  76,195  62,098  59,391 
idly.  Relatively  less  nondefense  R&D 
spending?  Probably.  Relatively  less capital 
Japan 
Germany 
60,796  100,511  165,730  227,708  spending?  Probably.  Differing  govern- 
38,148  30,198  30,582  32,140  mental  industrial  policies?  Possibly. 
Relatively  poorer  labor  quality?  Possibly. 
France  17,509  14,106  12,110  11,086  Relative6  - more  measurement  error? 
United  Kingdom  24,274  20,842 
Source:  OECD  Economic Studies, Autumn  1988. 
19,710  20,011  Possibly.‘Inferior  management  practices? 
Possibly.  More  stringent  governmental 
environmental  protection  regulations? 
Maybe. 
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